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 4 
Abstract	  
 
 
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide was supposed to, as its title states, prevent any further 
genocides from occurring.  In the event the United Nations could not 
prevent genocide the convention obligates all  member States to intervene 
and punish those perpetrating the crime. Despite the existence of the 
Genocide Convention the world has witnessed several more cases of 
genocide, some of which the perpetrators have either not been punished or 
have been punished long after they have committed the crime of genocide. 
With a lack of prevention and punishment critics of the Genocide 
Convention have labeled it  non-effective. Those affected by genocide 
declare that justice has not been served and that too often bureaucracy and 
back channels have prevented them from obtaining peace.  
 
This Master’s Thesis explores the claim that the Genocide 
Convention has been a failure and offers a perspective that includes the 
long term affects of the convention and what it  has meant to the study of 
genocide. This work greatly includes the efforts of the United Nations and 
various organizations that are dedicated to preventing armed conflicts that 
could potentially lead to genocide. State responsibility is another major 
issue discussed throughout this thesis given that in every case of genocide 
the State has had a major role. Hope for the future of the Genocide 
Convention is the last major theme of this thesis. Despite the many 
shortcomings of the United Nations and its member States the convention 
can be monumental in preventing genocide. 
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 7 
Introduction	  
 
 
The phrase “never again” has become one of the most notable vows 
of the 21s t  century. It  is a vow that has been recited by officials around 
the globe signifying their nation’s pledge to prevent and punish those who 
commit the crime of genocide. 140 states have signed on to aid in the 
defense of humanity in both times of war as well as in times of peace. Yet 
some sixty-seven years after this seemingly hallowed vow was etched into 
the minds of the international community, we still  find ourselves 
grappling with what Samantha Power has so appropriately termed the 
“problem from hell”1.   
 
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide brought to the international stage a call for the world 
to define and condemn the crime of genocide. In the years that followed, 
colleges and universities around the world have shown their support of the 
Convention by creating degree programs dedicated to the study of the 
Holocaust and genocide itself.  Some of these same schools have even 
sponsored travel learn opportunities to send their students to sites where 
genocide has taken place so that they can see with their own eyes the 
remnants of gas chambers, and hear the stories of struggle straight from 
the mouths of survivors. Memorial sites and museums were erected around 
                                                
1 Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide”  (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 
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the world to preserve the memory of the horrors of the Holocaust,  and to 
help create a future free of genocide. 
 
To the dismay of the remaining survivors of genocide, the world has 
witnessed the evolution of crimes against humanity rather than its 
eradication. Far from fearing the authority of the convention, perpetrators 
have instead become more brazen and ruthless. Suicide bombers and 
civilian soldiers stand at the ready to carry out the will of their leaders 
and their organizations. Governments supply these organizations with 
weapons and combat training instead of condemning them for threatening 
the civility of mankind. It  appears that there is very little concern for 
what the International Court of Justice, the United Nation’s Secretary 
General,  or any of the contracting parties of the Convention will do, and 
has resulted in a heightened threat to humanity.   
 
In the years after the adoption of the convention the world has seen 
several genocides. No mass murder could ever be ranked by severity, but 
there is certainly an upward trend in the progression of the crime. There 
has been an enormous increase in ethnically and religiously targeted 
raping and pillaging, public beheadings and suicide bombings. All of 
humanity is faced with a problem that won’t simply go away. No 
organization has a better understanding of the root causes for the increase 
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of these acts than the United Nations, which despite its promise of 
prevention and punishment for these crimes has only partially delivered.  
 
Though it  seems that the world has witnessed a rise in genocidal 
activity and crimes against humanity since the Genocide Convention came 
into force, there have actually been great strides toward prevention and 
punishment. The fact that the world has begun to pay more attention to 
these kinds of crimes shows that interest in stopping these criminals is 
growing. Our daily news circuit includes at least one segment about peace 
making in war torn countries and attempts to eliminate the threat of 
nuclear arms. These steps are preventative measures and certainly can 
assist in keeping disputes from becoming armed conflicts, which could 
potentially elevate to acts of genocide.  
 
The fundamental connection between armed conflict and genocide 
has been identified and acknowledged through genocide studies and 
through the unfortunate circumstance of witnessing genocide again and 
again. There have been tremendous efforts made to attack the threat of 
genocide at its core by preventing armed conflict.  In doing so the 
“smaller” issues that could potentially lead to genocide are quelled and 
though not always resulting in permanent peace, it  does save lives. This is 
an example of the developments in methods of prevention. Nations are 
sharing information and allowing foreign mediators to assist in their 
 10 
otherwise domestic issues to try and keep disputes from becoming wars 
and escalating from wars to acts of genocide.  
 
All of these developments are the result of the Genocide 
Convention. Without the Convention the term genocide would not have 
criminal or at the very least,  lawful meaning domestically or otherwise. 
The Convention has created the opportunity for protection from those who 
see The Ottoman Turks and Adolf Hitler as models of leadership. The 
Genocide Convention ignited a standard for international humanitarianism 
that not only sparks political conversations about the safety of protected 
groups, but is also grounded in prevention and punishment for the crime.   
 
At the same time criminals with genocidal intent have become more 
active across the globe and are adding more people to their ranks daily. 
They even operate within some of the party nations of the Convention, 
including the United States, France and the United Kingdom. How then 
can anyone proclaim the success or the failure of the Genocide 
Convention when there has been great improvement and a great deal of 
shortcomings? There have been major developments in the methods of 
prevention and there has certainly been better efforts made to bring 
genocidal criminals to justice. However, there has been an increase in 
cases of religious and ethnically motivated armed conflicts around the 
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world that have the potential to escalate to genocide. How can progress 
and regression exist at the same time?  
 
To understand how, one must first examine the brief background of 
the Convention, what it  aims to accomplish and its critiques. Within these 
margins lie the spectrum of the success and the shortcomings of the 
Convention. In reviewing the Genocide Convention it  has proven itself to 
be a sound tool for the contracting parties and for the rest of the world. It  
outlines every act that should be constituted as genocide and makes no 
discrimination on who can be held responsible for these acts. The 
Convention places upon the contracting parties the responsibility to 
prevent genocide and to punish those who commit the crime, which if 
otherwise left up to individual nations, may not be treated as a primary 
obligation. Despite the Convention’s shortcomings it  has been a beacon of 
hope for humanity in its efforts to be more humane regardless of ideology, 
race, creed, political or national differences. 
 
The	  Catalyst	  for	  This	  Thesis	  and	  Literature	  Review	  
 
The catalyst for this thesis is a travel-learn experience to Germany, 
Poland, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 2013. A cohort of 
graduate students majoring in Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Kean 
University sought out what remained of the genocides that once plagued 
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the three nations. During the trip the students visited the Sachenhausen 
Concentration Camp Museum in Oranienburg, Germany to see the rubble 
that used to serve as gas chambers. They then flew to Warsaw, Poland to 
visit  a Jewish community that has reestablished themselves after having 
had most of their congregation lost to the Holocaust.  To end the trip the 
students visited the Srebrenica-Potocari Genocide Memorial where they 
had the opportunity to meet survivors of the Bosnian Genocide and to see 
the vast graveyard of Bosnian Muslims and Croatians. 
 
Enlightened and touched by the stories shared by the survivors and 
experts that they met while abroad, the cohort of students returned from 
their trip wanting to know more about Genocide Studies. The first work 
suggested to them by the trip advisor was Samantha Power’s “A Problem 
From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide”.  Samantha Power is the 
permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations and 
has contributed much to the protection of human rights. Power has served 
as a Special Advisor to both the President of the United States and the 
Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. She has 
worked to preserve the freedom of protected groups in the United States 
and abroad in relation to the interests of the United States. She has also 
dedicated much of her efforts to U.N. reform and served as the Professor 
of the Practice of Global leadership and Public Policy at Harvard 
University.  
 13 
 
In her work A Problem From Hel, Power masterfully weaves 
together the thread of genocide thus far in our history and outlines the 
many times that Americans have failed to step in when they were needed 
most. Power prefaces her work by sharing her experience in 
Bosnia/Herzegovina where she has seen first hand the lack of response 
and concern for the state of Bosnia by her supervisor while working for 
the Washington Post .  Her supervisor’s actions was appalling and 
revealing to her. The rest of the book offered the same appalling and 
revealing effect to any reader seeking to learn about the history of 
genocide.  
 
The next area of research was on ways in which the atrocities 
described in Samantha Power’s book were being combatted. The platform 
for that research was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. Studying the text of the Convention itself offered 
an understanding of how the problem of genocide was being viewed by the 
world powers and what were the possible solutions to that problem. Along 
with learning about the text it  was also very helpful to understand the 
scholarly view of the Convention and its drafters. Dr. Paola Gaeta 
provided an insightful work entitled The UN Genocide Convention: A 
Commentary  that was the perfect gateway to the popular and not so 
popular thoughts about the Convention and it’s drafters.  
 14 
 
Dr. Gaeta’s work on the UN Genocide Convention provided sources 
of commentary and critical feedback on the Convention that begs serious 
questions about the intentions of the Drafters. It  inspired a rerouting of 
the original argument for this Master’s Thesis by suggesting questions 
regarding the applicability of the Convention. Not only did her work 
framed the questions, it  also gave logical ideas to provide realistic 
answers to the issues that keep the Genocide Convention and the United 
Nations from seeming so pointless in battle to prevent and punish the 
crime of genocide.  
 
One of the other pivotal figures that contributed to the research for 
this Master’s thesis was former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Kofi 
Annan served as the 7t h  Secretary-General of the United Nations from 
1997 to 2006. He shares the 2001 Nobel Peace Price with the United 
Nations for his and the organization’s “work for a better organized and 
more peaceful world.”2 Two of his works, Interventions  and We The 
Peoples: A UN for the 21s t  Century, offered a candid look into the actions 
taken by those at the United Nations that worked toward upholding the 
aims of the Genocide Convention and other humanitarian international 
                                                
2  "The Nobel Peace Prize 2001". Nobelprize.org.  Nobel Media AB 2014. 
Web. 11 Jun 2015. 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2001/index.html
> 
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laws and peace efforts.  Annan aims to reassure his readers that the United 
Nations is a useful organization and that it  is being developed to better 
address the issues of the times. His insight on preventing genocide 
specifically details the ways in which the UN will address the problem of 
genocide and who it  views the organization’s part in upholding the 
Convention.   
 
A	  Brief	  history	  of	  The	  Term	  Genocide	  and	  of	  The	  
Convention	  On	  The	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  The	  
Crime	  of	  Genocide	  
 
The term Genocide, coined by lawyer Raphael Lemkin, provided the 
foundation for the Convention. The experiences of the Armenian 
Genocide, that of the Assyrians in the Simele Massacre in Iraq, and the 
Holocaust inspired Lempkin to create a name for the heinous actions taken 
against populations.3 The word Genocide was first used in Lemkin’s book, 
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of 
Government, Proposals for Redress ,  in which the new word is defined as, 
“the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.”4 Genocide is further 
explained, “genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction 
of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all  members of 
                                                
3 Raphael Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” ,  (New Jersey: The 
Law book Exchange, LTD, 1944), 79-82 
4 Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” ,  (1944), 79 
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a nation. It  is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different 
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”5  
 
Lemkin describes the means to committing the crime of genocide by 
separating it  into two steps. The first step is to destroy the national 
pattern of the oppressed group, which is to alienate that group from the 
rest of the nation. The second step is to impose upon that group a desired 
national pattern.6 Systematic premeditated attacks on civilian groups with 
the intent of destroying those groups physically, mentally or otherwise 
was certainly inhumane, but until  Lemkin made his argument genocide 
was not an international or domestic crime. Genocidal acts, Lemkin 
proposed, was something that should be seen as criminal in the eyes of the 
world and in the eyes of international law. He made the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide his life’s work and began lobbying 
for the United Nations and the United States to take a stand on the matter.  
 
Using Hitler and Nazi Germany as the model for how destructive 
genocide is to humankind, Lemkin outlined the eight ways in which 
genocide impacts a population. Politics was a major tool used in the areas 
that Hitler seized. He completely removed each individual government 
and its form of governance and imposed German forms of governance. The 
                                                
5 Ibid, 79 
6 Ibid, 79-82 
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Nazis forced all remaining political leaders and officials to change their 
names to German names. They even went so far as to change the names of 
towns to German names to remove all remnants of the former political 
order.7  
 
The Nazi party made sure to gain full control of the social norms in 
the places that they annexed. Hitler removed members of the clergy and 
the intelligentsia from the rest of society so as to prevent any resistance 
to the newly imposed order. In Poland in particular members of the clergy 
were among the leaders of resistance and posed a serious threat to the 
regime. SS soldiers would capture these priests and transport them to 
labor camps to keep them from leading the people of Poland against 
them.8 Everything in the lands Hitler occupied would be refocused to 
support the war effort by the Nazi regime. All materials and goods were 
expropriated from the locals and given to the soldiers. In many cases, 
those who were allowed to stay in their homes had no choice but to allow 
visiting soldiers to live with them while they were stationed in that 
particular area. This would affect not only the households that the soldiers 
occupied but it  would sometimes also change the social makeup of the 
entire community.  
 
                                                
7 Ibid, 82 
8 Ibid, 83 
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Along with the social norms cultural norms too had been replaced. 
Hitler implemented a language policy that mandated for German to be 
made the national language and the only language allowed for use both in 
Germany and in occupied territories. Hitler banned the teaching of other 
languages and went so far as to replace non-German schoolteachers with 
German ones who taught only the prescribed coursework. Liberal arts 
studies were prohibited all throughout grade school and National 
Socialism was a mandated study for children. All media was regulated to 
only promote Nazi propaganda.9 In conducting genocide stripping the 
victims of their culture is next to physically harming them perhaps the 
most impactful components of the crime because as time goes on it  
becomes extremely difficult to realign with cultural practices. For 
example there were an estimated 11 million Yiddish speaking Jews in the 
world. Now it is estimated that only about 600,000 of the world’s Jewish 
population can speak Yiddish.10 
 
One of the most memorable of the cultural control tactics used by 
the Nazis was the burning of books. Any literary work that was deemed 
contrary to the Nazi agenda was confiscated, thrown in a large pile, 
usually in an open area, and burned. Among those burned were works by 
Jewish authors, any literature regarding Marxism or communism, books 
                                                
9 Ibid, 85 
10 “Yiddish Facts”, last modified: 2015, 
http://jewishstudies.rutgers.edu/yiddish/102-department-of-jewish-
studies/yiddish/159-yiddish-faqs 
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about sex education, and works considered pacifist or liberal.  One 
instance of a Nazi soldier destroying the library of a Jewish seminary in 
Poland tells just how much it meant to the Nazis to remove these forms of 
culture:  
 
“For us it  was a matter of special pride to destroy the Talmudic 
Academy which was known as the greatest in Poland... .  We threw 
out of the building the great Talmudic library, and carted it  to 
market. There we set fire to the books. The fire lasted for twenty 
hours. The Jews of Lublin were assembled around and cried 
bitterly. Their cries almost silenced us. Then we summoned the 
military band and the joyful shouts of the soldiers silenced the 
sounds of the Jewish cries.”11 
 
Religious and moral restrictions also played a major role. The 
clergy and religious leaders were targeted for having the following and 
trust of the oppressed group(s) to incite resistance and to help retain faith 
that liberation will come. Removing them also removes their belief and 
their connection to God and the mainstream society. Imposing the beliefs 
of the oppressor minimalizes faith, forcing the oppressed to obey only in 
the will of the oppressor. Hitler imposed a ban on public displays of 
Judaism and had children over the age of fourteen renounce their religious 
affiliation and enroll in the youth Nazi organizations.12 Some Jews even 
                                                
11 Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe” ,  (1944), 85 
12Ibid, 89 
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found themselves serving as informants for the Nazi soldiers, alerting 
them to any violations of the rules. 
 
To attack the moral condition of the oppressed group the oppressor 
promotes immoral behaviors. For example, the Nazis made the price of 
food higher while keeping the price of alcohol relatively cheap in order to 
encourage consumption.13 Without realizing it  the oppressed public will 
become more susceptible to Nazi propaganda and will still  be in fear of 
their oppressor but less willing to fight.  This tactic is also intended to 
draw the attention of the oppressed peoples to the most basic instincts. 
This would keep their minds off of the larger issue of obtaining freedom 
or regaining their nationality. 
 
To further distract the oppressed groups from focusing on their 
liberation, the oppressor interferes or removes the group’s ability to 
participate in economics. Without financial investment in the state the 
group is even less of a member of that state in the eyes of the oppressor. 
Hitler imposed terrible standards of living while seizing the assets of the 
Jewish population. He forced them into ghettos in which they were forced 
to barter for goods. In many cases those imprisoned in ghettos had to use 
a form of money that differed even from that of the German mark. The 
Nazis took over the banks and restricted use of those banks only to those 
                                                
13 Ibid, 90 
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who had converted themselves into the German culture.14 This was a 
luxury not usually afforded to the Jewish population no matter the 
circumstance.  
 
Lastly physical and biological regulations were imposed to bring 
about the physical end of the oppressed groups. Marriage and procreation 
within the group is banned to try and limit the growth of the population. It  
was even made illegal for a German to procreate with a Jewish person, 
specifically with a Jewish woman being that the Jewish bloodline is 
considered to be matriarchal. In Poland, the Nazis would separate the 
males from their wives and send them to labor camps to keep them from 
producing more children.15 Many times it  would not be to labor camps but 
instead to gas chambers and crematoria to be killed in large masses. If 
they did make it  to a labor camp many of those imprisoned would be shot 
down in the middle of the camp for frivolous accusations such as not 
working hard enough or simply for stopping between duties. 
 
Hitler’s reign of terror brought to light the threat of genocide. 
Intentional systematic killing became an issue that humanity could no 
longer ignore. The Armenian genocide had gone relatively unnoticed until  
Hitler and the Nazi party mirrored and built  upon the tactics used by the 
Turks against the Armenians. Thankfully, those at the United Nations 
                                                
14Ibid, 85 
15Ibid, 86 
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were able to see that if nothing were to be done to stop Hitler that he 
would continue his deadly campaign throughout the rest of the world. One 
such person at the UN was Raphael Lemkin.  
Lemkin had been a witness to the early stages of the Holocaust.  He 
escaped from Poland during Hitler’s takeover of Europe and made his way 
to Switzerland and then to New York where he would begin his lobbying 
for an international ban on genocide. However, it  would not come as easy 
as stating what he knew was well underway in Europe. Lemkin would 
have to impress the United Nations and its member States with a proposal 
that truly warranted the signing of an international law.  
 
Lemkin took his proposal for an international ban on genocide to 
the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in 
1933.  He proposed that two crimes be added to the international law code 
and that perpetrators of such crimes should be prosecuted wherever they 
are. The first was the crime of barbarity, which included destructive 
actions directed at individuals and groups. The second was the crime of 
vandalism, which included destructive actions against works of art and 
cultural objects.16 He also proposed that a convention be created to 
maintain the new laws. Lemkin included in his proposal that each state 
that agrees to add these crimes to the international law code should make 
provisions to their domestic law codes that support and mirror that of the 
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international code. In doing so States denounce the crimes both at home 
and abroad, giving criminals no place to hide.17 It  would also give the 
Contracting Parties the ability to intervene when necessary.   
 
Unfortunately Lemkin’s proposal did not receive much support at 
the Conference. It  wouldn’t be until  after the Holocaust ended that the 
world would begin to heed his warnings about the oppressive regimes like 
the one created by Hitler,  who, if not preempted, would spread the terror 
of genocide throughout Europe and beyond. Despite being a living 
testament to Hitler’s brutalities Lemkin still  had little support from the 
United States for the passing of his proposal.  It  would take until  1946 for 
the proposal to gain enough support to make it  to a vote, and in 1948, 
after having to edit and re-edit the proposal the General Assembly passed 
the proposal unanimously. In 1950 Lemkin was able to convince the 20 
countries he needed to have the Convention passed into law, and in 
October of that year the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for 
the Crime of Genocide became internationally recognized. 
 
The text of the Genocide Convention has been subjected to much 
criticism. For many reasons the Convention’s text has both inspired hope 
in some and doubt in others. The Convention is supposed to be a 
monumental step in mankind’s effort to preserve civility and human life, 
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however, as some critics have pointed out, the need for such a law also 
identifies the disregard for humanitarian laws already in place. To 
understand any criticism or praise of the Convention it  is necessary to 
understand its text.   
	  
The	  Most	  Impactful	  Articles	  of	  The	  Genocide	  Convention	  
 
The preamble of the Convention sets the tone for its contracting 
parties and for the future of the Convention itself.  It  states, “Recognizing 
that all  periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; 
and being convinced that,  in order to liberate mankind from such an 
odious scourge, international co-operation is required.”18 First,  i t  
recognizes genocide not as a new crime but as something that has plagued 
mankind throughout all  periods of history. By stating this the United 
Nations as a representative of the civilized world, is taking responsibility 
for having allowed genocide to occur until  now. It acknowledges that 
mankind as a whole has suffered the effects of genocide and that now is 
the time to end it .  The preamble also requires international co-operation. 
It  doesn’t ask for co-operation, nor does it  suggest co-operation, it  
requires global co-operation, effectively making the Convention null and 
void without that most important ingredient.  
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The actual text of the Convention is comprised of nineteen articles. 
Of those nineteen the most important for understanding the purpose and 
applicability of the Convention are Articles I,  II,  III,  V, VI, and VIII.  
Article I states, “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”19 This is 
the second most important statement. It  differentiates the crime of 
genocide from war crimes. This is a key separation because it  keeps 
defense lawyers from arguing that their clients (on trial for acts of 
genocide) were acting under the context of war. Article I also binds the 
contracting States by the obligation to prevent genocide and the 
obligation to punish those who commit the crime. Again, the Convention’s 
strong language leaves no room for interpretation.  
 
Article II outlines the actions that constitute as acts of genocide. 
The acts are listed as “killing members of the group, causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part,” or any other harmful action taken with 
the intention to eliminate and or prevent the livelihood of a particular 
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group.20 The element of intent part of what makes the crime of genocide 
so uniquely different from war crimes and acts of terror.  
 
In Article III the acts that shall be punishable under the Convention 
are outlined. Those acts are listed as, “genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to 
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.”21 Through Article III every 
relation to the crime of genocide is encompassed. Everyone that is 
responsible for the execution of the crime, even those that do not prevent 
the crime, are accounted for and will share the punishment for the crime. 
Article IV confirms that anyone found guilty of any of the acts in Article 
III will be punished, “Persons committing genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals.”22 It  confirms that no person has immunity from punishment 
for the crime of genocide, not even Presidents or other forms of Heads of 
State.  
 
Article V is, effectively, what gives the international law domestic 
applications. It  reads, “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in 
accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation 
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to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in 
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or 
any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”23 Though the Convention 
should have an overarching authority over the prevention and punishment 
of genocide it  is most certainly not as strong bind than that of the 
constitutions of its contracting parties. When domestic laws mirror those 
of international laws it  further validates the international law. 
 
To enforce the law it takes more than the presence of the law, it  
also needs a court to determine the guilt  or innocence of the accused. 
Article VI provides the guidelines for trying those accused of committing 
the crime of genocide, “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other 
acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the 
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”24 
 
For cases where a crime was committed in one of the Contracting 
States by a person or by persons who are citizens of another one of the 
Contracting States, the drafters thought it  wise to include directions on 
extradition. Article VII outlines the responsibility of States in these cases. 
It  reads, “Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not 
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be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The 
Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.”25 
 
Article VIII gives each State the “power” to call upon the United 
Nations when combating or preventing genocide. The article reads, “Any 
Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as 
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”26  
 
Though “Lemkin’s law” had finally been passed, it  would take some 
time before it  was truly put into use. The concepts set forth by the 
Convention required a level of cooperation that the world wasn’t ready to 
commit to. It  was evident in the time it  took to bring Lemkin’s proposal to 
an actual vote despite what Hitler and the Nazis were doing in Europe. 
The United States Senate as well as President Eisenhower refused to 
support ratification of the Convention. It  would take 38 years after the 
Convention became law for the United States to ratify. The reluctance 
shown by the U.S. and other Member States to ratify shows just how 
important it  is for the security of mankind to have the Convention in 
place. Without the Convention the protected groups of the world would be 
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vulnerable to genocidal acts with little prospects of security from their 
country.  
 
Criticisms	  of	  the	  Convention	  
 
Despite being a major step toward a safer world, the Genocide 
Convention has undergone great scrutiny since it’s drafting. Critics 
question the applicability of the Convention for various reasons. Some are 
blinded by their need for instant gratification and others critique solely on 
historical facts. Nonetheless, those who have read the text of the 
Convention and have offered their critiques either via lecture or by way of 
their own work, typically have strong opinions on its drafters and the 
Contracting Parties for having agreed to it .  However, like all great 
movements of change it  cannot be immune to scrutiny if it  intends to 
improve and actually make change.  
 
One of the arguments against the Convention’s text and purpose is 
that its aims do not support each other and that instead the obligation to 
punish feeds off of the failure to meet the obligation to prevent. The two 
aims of the Convention are stated in Article I as if to be two parts of one 
whole, but skeptics of the Convention’s practicality, like Paola Gaeta, 
 30 
make the point that the obligation to punish is contingent on the failure of 
the obligation to prevent.27 She argues that: 
 “The missing link between prevention and punishment is 
commission: when situated on a timeline, punishment gives 
evidence to commission which, in turn, indicates the failure of 
prevention.”28  
 
She goes on to say: 
 
 “Given that the eradication of this ‘odious scourge’ requires the 
willingness, indeed the commitment, to set up strong preventive 
mechanisms engaging, when necessary, the use of force, the 
preference for post-factum criminal processes, while not 
surprising, is disappointing: insofar as punishment indicates the 
failure of prevention, it  would appear that the drafters inserted a 
duty to prevent that was designed to be honored by its breach.”29 
 
What can be expected of a law that is vague when it  comes to 
punishment? Who would abide by that law if they could get away with 
breaking it? People break laws all of the time until  they get caught and 
are reprimanded. Though they could potentially break those very same 
laws again they would think twice before doing so recognizing the threat 
of imprisonment or death.  
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The joined concepts of the Convention work together in the same 
way. The two compliment each other and one would lose its applicability 
without the other. Though genocide could be prevented without having to 
resort to punishment, punishment still  looms over those who consider 
committing the crime of genocide. The idea of crime and punishment 
exists for that very reason. Without punishment there would be no weight 
to the law. That is why domestic laws and other international laws include 
sanctions for those that do not adhere to them because one cannot be 
taken seriously without the other. The same idea is applied to The 
Convention. To ask nations to prevent genocide without including 
punishments is to ask them to support a weightless law. 
 
Gaeta’s argument is,  however, supported by the continuous failure 
of states to meet the obligation to prevent, leaving them no choice but to 
resort to punishment. After the Convention became international law the 
crime began to occur more often. Just twenty years after the Convention 
the Khmer Rouge began their reign of terror in Cambodia. Five years later 
the Iraqi government began killing its Kurdish population. In 1994 
hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda at the hands of 
their rival tribe, the Hutu, and their state collaborators. Around that same 
time the killing of Croatians and Muslims broke out in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. It  took until  1998 for the first conviction for the crime of 
genocide; even then only one of these cases saw justice.30 
 
What is widely believed to be a major flaw in the drafting of the 
Genocide Convention is that the drafters intentionally neglected to make 
States legally liable contributors to genocide. Dr. Gaeta makes this 
argument in her work, “The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary”, 
“Some of the drafters criticized an amendment proposed by the UK and 
forcefully and repeatedly supported by the British delegate, Gerald 
Fitzmaurice. This amendment was directed to add a provision stating that 
acts of genocide could be submitted to the ICJ [International Court of 
Justice] even in cases where it  was alleged that genocide was an ‘act of 
the State itself or Government itself or any organ or authority of the State 
or Government’. The criticisms (primarily by the US, France, the 
Philippines, but also by Canada, Ecuador, and China) and the consequent 
withdrawal by the UK of its amendment, clearly show that the authors of 
the Convention intended only to deal with individual’ criminal liability 
for genocide.” 31 
 
 The fact that the U.S. and other nations tried and succeeded in 
debasing the proposal of UK delegate Fitzmaurice makes debunking her 
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argument much more complicated, and to a degree she is correct in her 
conclusion. However there was a subtle mention of State responsibility in 
a 1947 resolution to the draft Convention that may suggest otherwise. It  
read, “Reaffirming its resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime 
of genocide; declaring that genocide is an international crime entailing a 
national and international responsibility on the part of individuals and 
States;”32 Though it  doesn’t dismiss Gaeta’s point it  does suggest that the 
Contracting Parties drafted the Convention with State responsibility in 
mind and that it  was an understanding among the Contracting Parties that 
the Convention applied to each State itself.   
 
After learning of the Armenian Genocide and the gory details of the 
Holocaust,  which are the two of the major influences of the Convention, 
that were both carried out by representatives of their respective States, it  
left many skeptical of the true applicability of the Convention as well as 
the intention of its drafters when there was seemingly a lack of direct 
language towards state responsibility. There is no denying that the 
wording of the Convention is certainly geared toward the individual, so 
critics are right to question the intentions of its drafters. For example 
Article IV states that,   
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“Persons  commit t ing  genocide  or  any  of  the  o ther  ac ts  enumera ted  in  a r t ic le  I I I  
sha l l  be  punished  whether  they  are  cons t i tu t iona l ly  respons ib le  ru lers ,  publ ic  of f ic ia ls  
or  pr iva te  ind iv iduals .”33 
 
Scholars who prescribe to this critique look to the Nuremburg trials and to 
the nature of most cases of genocide and believe that the General 
Assembly made a terrible decision by individualizing the crime.  
 
The decision has led to a feeling among scholars and state officials 
that the states involved with the drafting of the Convention had only 
themselves in mind and sought to establish the law while being exempt 
from it.  Professor Bassiouni gave an interesting perspective regarding the 
matter:  
“ ’Nuremberg’  focused  on  ind iv idual  c r iminal  respons ib i l i ty  for  conduct  tha t  
was  the  product  of  s ta te  pol icy  and  for  which  co l lec t ive  respons ib i l i ty  and  
s ta te  respons ib i l i ty  could  have  been  assessed .  Those  who es tab l i shed  the  IMT 
were  carefu l  to  avoid  the  not ions  of  s ta te  and  co l lec t ive  respons ib i l i ty ,  except  
wi th  respec t  to  c r iminal  organiza t ions ,  namely  the  SS,  SD,  and  SA.  The  s imple  
reason  is  tha t  these  governments  d id  not  want  to  es tab l ish  a  pr inc ip le  tha t  
could  one  day  be  appl ied  to  them.” 34 
 
The United States, for example greatly benefited from the 
individualization of the crime of genocide and from having major 
influence in the United Nations. In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress, an 
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American civil rights organization, drafted a petition entitled “We Charge 
Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People”.  The 
petition was presented to members of the United Nations accusing the 
United States Government of having been complicit and for directly 
committing acts of genocide against the “negro people”. The CRC claimed 
that the Government committed heinous and degrading acts against the 
African American population for being “negro”, with the intent to destroy 
the entire population both in whole and in part,  which according to the 
Genocide Convention, qualified as acts of genocide.   
 
Among the evidence supporting the CRC’s claims was the Jim Crow 
Laws, which supported segregation of whites from blacks in every facet of 
American life and encouraged white Americans to inflict physical,  
psychological and economic harm on African Americans. As a result of 
these laws and the culture they created it  had become a normal practice in 
business to systematically disenfranchise African Americans by 
deliberately not hiring them. In situations where blacks were hired they 
were only allowed to have the lowest paying positions. Legislation was 
passed in some states to keep blacks from being eligible to vote. For 
example state polls implemented literacy tests,  which would prove to be a 
challenge to the African American voting population because most of 
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them, to that point,  had received low quality education and in many cases 
could not read at all .  35 
 
Blacks were forced to live in ghettos with substandard housing 
accommodations. Lynchings of African Americans had become public 
spectacles where an entire town would attend to witness the horrible 
occasion. Between 1882 and 1929 approximately 3,306 African Americans 
had been lynched nation wide with the majority of occurrences happing 
within the confederate states.36 Blacks faced violent treatment by the 
police across the nation and there was a major lack of medical care and 
access to education for majority of the African American population.37 
 
The United States Government and the media fought the petition. 
The Department of Defense even requested that the NAACP publicly 
denounce the petition, which the organization almost did but decided 
against it  due to the fact that the organization was cited as one of the 
sources in the petition. Lemkin objected to the petition on the basis of the 
birth rate of African Americans. His view was that the plight of Blacks in 
America was nothing like the mass atrocities happening in Europe. The 
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United Nations has no record of the petition and it  is believed to be 
because neither of the U.S. delegates at the time would take the petition 
seriously enough to speak on its behalf.  However the petition did make it  
to Britain and other European countries. In Europe the public embraced 
the document and showed outspoken skepticism of the U.S. Government 
for having misused its influence by keeping the petition from reaching the 
Convention floor. 
 
By keeping the petition from reaching the tables of U.N. 
representatives the United States never had to take responsibility for its 
compliance and execution of genocidal acts directed at its African 
American population. Perhaps if there was stronger language included in 
the text of the Convention at that time regarding State responsibility other 
nations would have stepped up and pushed for the petition to be officially 
reviewed by the General Assembly. Instead the “We Charge Genocide”  
petition is nothing more than a dead document drafted by a disbanded 
organization.     
 
Addressing	  The	  Criticism	  
 
Professors Gaeta and Bassiouni’s points are strong regarding the 
reasoning behind states electing to individualize the crime of genocide. 
However, instead of directly solving the issue of not making states 
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directly responsible their points only lead to more questions; can an entire 
State be complicit in the crime of genocide or if it  should only be the 
individuals who undertook to commit the crime that should be held legally 
responsible? The problem with holding an entire State responsible for the 
crime of genocide is that it  could throw a State’s political and economic 
make up into disarray. For instance if an entire branch, or the leadership 
of every office within the U.S Government that signed off on a decision 
that was found to be complicit in or active in committing the crime of 
genocide was to be held responsible for the crime of genocide it  is likely 
that the Republic itself would implode. In a democracy like the one 
practiced in the U.S. the line of command would essentially be exhausted 
if the current leaders were removed from their positions, leaving the 
nation without a government until  the lengthy process of elections were 
completed.  
 
 Nonetheless, the fact is that without aid from a government or some 
branch or organization funded by the government genocide is almost 
impossible to commit. It  truly seems unjust to leave states out of the 
wording of the Convention knowing the amount of resources it  would take 
to perpetrate such a crime. Taking an “individual approach” to 
establishing the international criminal law of genocide left a large gap in 
the law itself.  If a single person or a small group can commit the crime of 
genocide then why could a nation not do the same? Comparing the ability 
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to commit the crime between individuals and nations leaves a truly 
lopsided argument. Given the fact that governments have played major 
roles in all  of the known genocides it  would be not just helpful to include 
specific language regarding state responsibility, it  is absolutely necessary 
to do so if the crime of genocide is to be punishable. 
 
The very idea that a single person could commit something so 
elaborate is far-fetched. Surely one man or woman could take actions to 
commit the crime, however, it  would take a great deal of time, man power, 
and resources, all  of which would more than likely lead to the discovery 
of their plan before they could actually complete it .  A small cohort of 
people would have the man power to make pulling it  off somewhat easier 
but would still  require access to the necessary resources. The only way for 
small groups of people to commit the crime of genocide is to be at the 
helm of a nation or to have the support of a nation or its representatives.   
 
For example the genocide of the Tutsi population in Rwanda was far 
less likely to have happened if not for the earlier involvement and 
mishandling of the situation by the German and Belgian colonial officials. 
Tutsi and Hutu clans traditionally distinguished themselves from one 
another based on class and not ethnicity. Belgian missionaries sent to 
Rwanda to oversee the governance of the State implemented the idea of 
racial superiority by introducing foolish criteria such as the length of ones 
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nose as a means to distinguish aristocracy.38 Only with the influence and 
support of the Belgian officials did the Tutsi begin to discriminate against 
the Hutu by forcing them into menial jobs, keeping them out of political 
positions and forcing them to carry identification cards describing their 
ethnic background. This would be the precursor to the backlash from the 
Hutu majority once they able to acquire political power, which was also 
supported by Belgian officials,  that lead to the slaughter and displacement 
of over 200,000 members of the Tutsi clan.  
 
Prior to the arrival of colonial masters the people of Rwanda did 
not oppress each other. There was certainly no build-up to armed conflict 
and much less toward the genocide of any of the three populations that 
inhabited the country. Though the Hutu and Tutsi had their differences it  
was Belgian officials that created racial issues between the two clans. It  
was Belgian officials that allowed one clan to oppress the other, creating 
major tensions, and then not balancing out the political arena once the 
oppressed population gained political power. The Rwandan genocide was 
very much the product of the German and Belgian colonialism.  
 
Offenses that could be attributed to a single individual are the more 
“secondary” means such as conspiring to commit the crime of genocide, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and complicity in 
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genocide.39 Even then the individuals being accused of these crimes must 
poses a certain amount of power before any sane minded person would 
take them seriously enough to assist them in committing genocide. This 
does not mean that individuals within State parties cannot commit the 
crime of genocide. Professor Bassiouni put it  best when he stated:   
“ In  a l l  cases ,  ind iv iduals  commit  c r imes .  What  i s  ca l led  ‘s ta te  ac t ion’  and  
‘s ta te  favor ing  pol icy’  does  not  a l te r  the  fac t  tha t  one  or  more  ind iv idual  
au thors  a re  involved .  The  charac ter iza t ions  of  ‘s ta te  ac t ion  and  ‘s ta te  favor ing  
pol icy’  re fer  to  co l lec t ive  dec is ion  making  and  ac t ions  by  indiv iduals  who 
develop  a  pol icy  or  who execute  a  pol icy  or  car ry  out  ac ts  which  cons t i tu te  
in te rna t ional  c r imes  under  lega l  au thor i ty .” 40 
 
However, if those individuals use the apparatus of the State to 
commit the crime then the State must bear some responsibility.  
 
There should be exceptions made for those persons who attempted 
to prevent and or stop the criminal acts, as they have clearly shown no 
complicity to the crime. There should also be constraints on how the 
entire state would be punished so as not to stifle the freedom or prosperity 
of the state. Despite the inhumane nature of the crime punishment should 
not exclude the eventual rehabilitation, forgiveness, and reconciliation. If 
even one of these principles were left out the authority handing out the 
punishment would be no better than the perpetrators of the crime.  
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Gaeta makes another argument that is perhaps a bit “picky” on the 
wording of the Convention. She makes the claim that the Convention does 
not prohibit the Contracting States from committing the crime of 
genocide.41 Suffice it  to say that it  is important to include every possible 
outcome when drafting a law. In doing so one encompasses every 
possibility for committing the crime that the law seeks to prevent. 
However, it  can be, and most likely was assumed by the United Nations 
that a Contracting Party would refrain from committing the crime of 
genocide if they are pledging to prevent and punish those who do. Those 
Parties who confirm the text of the Convention by doing so also agree not 
to commit the crime.  
 
Her mentioning this point is,  though unnecessary, is not completely 
frivolous. As mentioned States are capable of carrying out an act of 
genocide. It  would make a more compelling argument to suggest that the 
Convention is predicated on something that is hard to guarantee: 
international cooperation, prevention at the State level,  and punishment at 
every level.  The Preamble of the Convention all but demands that the 
Contracting Parties cooperate when it  states that international cooperation 
is required to win the war on genocide.42 How then does the United 
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Nations make sure that these demand are met? History says simply that it  
cannot while the future assures that it  can and will.  
	  
The	  Scope	  of	  Prevention	  
	  
To gauge the limitations on the United Nations to guarantee that the 
Convention will be upheld by its Member States it  helps to understand the 
three requirements placed upon the Contracting Parties. Preventing 
genocide has been one the most challenging goals to meet for the United 
Nations. Most scholars see the Convention as a failed and useless 
international law because prevention has eluded the Contracting Parties 
ever since it  came into force. There has been much progress in providing 
and implementing preventative measures to intercept criminals and to 
quell conflicts before they reach the point of genocide. Nonetheless there 
is still  much more to be done to assure that preventative measures have a 
lasting effect wherever and whenever they are implemented. 
 
The concept of prevention is hard to articulate, especially when it  
comes to armed conflict.  It  is a concept that includes such elements like 
control,  force, and in many cases intervention- all  of which make world 
leaders extremely uncomfortable. The idea of prevention has tested the 
world’s commitment to the international safety from the very conception 
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of the Convention and has proven to be one of, if  not the major roadblock. 
Political leaders fear that their sovereignty will be denigrated, that their 
citizens and their neighbors will no longer believe in their nation’s ability 
to protect its people if they allow other nations to have instant authority 
on their shores, even in the special circumstances of preventing genocide.  
 
The truth is that no nation is impermeable to the horrors of 
genocide. Even when it  occurs in other nations it  affects us all  as a 
civilized society of human beings. In the battle to end armed conflict,  
specifically genocide, the fact that this fear of losing power is still  
driving wedges between nations is proof that the Convention has had 
mostly conditional priority to our leaders.  Former Secretary General of 
the United Nations Kofi Annan has dealt with these fears first hand. He 
waded through them during his time in office and notes that our leaders 
still  have yet to overcome that fear. In his presentation on the Carnegie 
Commission on the subject of preventing deadly conflict,  he shared his 
disappointment with the lack of international collaboration: 
 
 “And yet we seem never to learn. Time and again differences are 
allowed to develop into disputes and disputes allowed to develop 
into deadly conflicts.  Time and again, warning signs are ignored 
and pleas for help overlooked. Only after the deaths and the 
destruction do we intervene, at a far higher human and material 
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cost and with far fewer lives to save. Only when it  is too late do 
we value prevention.”43 
 
History has proven the former Secretary General right; nations do 
not value prevention as much as they should. It  begs the question then: if 
our leaders don’t value prevention then why would they agree to the terms 
set forth by the Convention? Perhaps the issue isn’t so much that we don’t 
value prevention but that we don’t yet know how to prevent genocide; we 
certainly didn’t when the Convention was made into law. When the 
leaders of our nations signed on to the Genocide Convention it  is possible 
that they were acting out of impulse. For some countries this was an 
opportunity to seek the security needed to help stabilize their 
governments. For others it  was peer pressure or fear of missing out on an 
opportunity to have a say during the development of a monumental 
convention.  
 
Though the Holocaust was not the first time mankind had fallen 
victim to the horrors of genocide it  had yet to be identified as an 
international crime. This new crime therefore demanded of the world 
leaders something that they had always seemed to avoid: unselfish 
international collaboration. Winston Churchill  described it  as “a crime 
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without a name.”44 Before Lemkin genocide was seemingly an anomaly 
that left the world powers with an extremely difficult decision to make. 
Do they stand by the claim that nations have the right to sovereignty over 
their domestic affairs, even when they threaten the security of their 
minority populations? Or do foreign nations have a responsibility to band 
together to assure that all  people everywhere can count one another to 
come to their aid when their own governments cannot or refuses to? 
Lemkin’s argument eventually won over the parties of the U.N. but that 
was only a third of the battle.  
 
Applying	  Preventative	  Measures	  
 
Preventing genocide would be an even bigger challenge than 
expected. The U.N. was tasked with creating measures that would 
intercept the crime before it  happened. Which begged the question: how 
do you identify genocide in the making? What factors or actions should be 
seen as preparation to carry out the crime of genocide? Developing a 
model for preventing genocide would take years and still  has yet to be 
perfected. However the strides towards accomplishing prevention have 
been great.   
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The United Nations has received much assistance from the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, who has established a Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict.  In 1999 they were able to help identify a 
“formula” or strategies for accomplishing the task of preventing genocide 
that if  implemented could greatly reduce the threat of armed conflicts that 
have the potential to escalate into genocide. The Commission breaks 
genocide prevention into two categories: the first is “operational 
prevention” and the second is “structural prevention”.45 The “operational 
preventive strategy” includes early warning, preventative diplomacy, 
preventative deployment and early humanitarian action.46 The “structural 
strategy” includes preventative disarmament, development and peace 
building.47 Both categories of strategies offer the potential for a great 
amount of good, however many of the strategies rest upon faulty 
foundations.  
 
Preventative deployment, which is the deployment of UN troops 
along and within the borders of nations that show signs of rising armed 
conflict for the purpose of monitoring those conflicts and trying to 
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contain them, has proven to be a successful strategy.48 Particularly in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia preventative deployment helped 
the newly independent state obtain stability. The UN troops were 
stationed there from 1995 until  1999 and helped keep out any illegal flow 
of small arms that might have aided NLA or KLA rebels in toppling 
Macedonia’s stride toward independence and recognition.49 The presence 
of the troops may have also kept the fighting in Albania from spreading 
over into Macedonia, which at the time consisted of a one fourth Albanian 
population.50 
 
Preventative diplomacy, the most common method of preventing 
any armed conflict,  has been increasingly effective over the past two 
decades. The United Nations has committed itself to creating 
opportunities for conflicting parties to engage in discussion in order to 
seek a resolution to their differences. Through its Department of Political 
Affairs in 2006, a Mediation Support Unit has been created to send 
mediators to places of possible conflict to help direct the process of 
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establishing peace. The Department has even established a standby team 
of mediators who are “on call” at the need of the mediators on site.51  
 
Humanitarian action, the last of the “structural prevention” 
strategies is also a common method used by nations attempting to quell 
conflict,  specifically in the developing world. The UN and NGOs 
typically are the ones contributing to these efforts but some nations, on 
occasion, have been willing to provide assistance to allies and those in 
need. In many cases where civilians are under threat of becoming 
collateral damage, or when they are directly attacked, the international 
community is very quick in their response to helping the victims. Today’s 
rapid stream of media amplifies the pressure for governments to assist in 
humanitarian efforts,  which greatly contributes to a nation’s willingness 
to assist long term.  
 
The “structural” preventative measures too have had positive 
applications in the war on genocide. Preventative disarmament is a key 
strategy in calming a quickly rising conflict.  Simply put, if  a killer has no 
weapon he is more likely to either run from the conflict or become open to 
the idea of resolution. In either case the armed phase of the conflict has 
ended and it  is likely that there will be far less if any casualties at all .   
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 Development and peace-building though set as separate strategies 
in the Commission’s evaluation are in fact part of the same phase of 
preventing genocide and other forms of armed conflict.  Genocide can 
occur anywhere but specifically in “third-world countries” often 
economics and hardship are paired with age-old religious and ethnic 
rivalries. Class prejudice, religious and racial differences have been the 
root of many armed conflicts.  Aiming directly at those core issues not 
only stops armed conflict while it  is happening but it  can certainly be a 
powerful tool for preventing it .   
 
In 2014 the United Nations improved upon the Carnegie 
Commission’s efforts.  It  released a publication entitled “Framework of 
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention” 52 that gives one of 
the most comprehensive outlines for identifying risk factors that could 
lead to genocide. The publication divides the risk factors into two 
sections: the first being common risk factors and the second being 
specific risk factors.53 The common risk factors are factors that affect the 
entirety of the state while the specific risk factors pertain to situations 
that directly involve or target specific groups.  
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The common risk factors, when identified and intercepted, could be 
the best means of preventing genocide. Of the common risk factors armed 
conflict or other forms of instability are among the most common. These 
kinds of situations are ones that place the State under duress and can 
create an environment conducive to armed and unarmed conflict.  An 
example of this situation would be that of the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
the outbreak of fighting that would eventually lead to the Bosnian 
genocide. A way to detect the potential for armed conflict is to review a 
record of serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. If a State has a history of treating its citizens, in whole 
or in part,  in an inhumane way it  is quite likely that the State could 
potentially either commit or become complicit in genocidal activity.  
 
The example of the former Yugoslavia is also a case where there 
was a major weakness in the state structure. Circumstances such as the 
disbanding of the former Yugoslavia are circumstances that negatively 
affect the ability of a State to prevent atrocity crimes that could 
potentially result in armed conflicts and genocide. Without a stable or 
willing government it  is very likely that this State could see a high level 
of conflict.  In Srebrenica Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were left 
defenseless against the Serbian Army. Neither the State nor the United 
Nations troops could (or would) protect them. Even when refugees made it  
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to the compound only about 2,500 were to be allowed in. Sadly even those 
who made it  in would be released to face their deaths.   
 
Motives or incentives are sometimes tough to identify early enough 
but they remain a key factor in identifying a crime as genocide. These are 
the reasons that perpetrators of genocide use to justify the use of violence 
against protected groups. In the case of Germany after WWI, it  was 
relatively easy for Hitler and the Nazi Party to convince the dispirited 
German public to support the Party’s aims after having lost in the war and 
in the midst of a deep economic crisis.  The Nazi Party created an “other” 
out of the Jews and every so-called “non-Arian” and used their creation to 
fuel hatred throughout the nation, resulting in the enslavement, 
displacement, and death of approximately six million.  
 
 Another major risk factor used to identify and prevent possible 
armed conflict is to monitor the capacity of a state or other actors to 
commit atrocity crimes. It  is not enough for a state or group of actors to 
be motivated to commit an atrocity crime; they must also have the 
capacity to commit the crime. Though Germany was doomed to pay for 
their participation in WWI, Hitler was able to galvanize manpower 
through propaganda and by removing outside influence from public view. 
By doing so he manufactured the support of the entire country. Those who 
didn’t support the ideals of the party were made to work in factories to 
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make the weapons that would be used against other decenters and “non-
Arians”.  
 
When there is the absence of mitigating factors or when the State’s 
armed forces lack in numbers, equipment or training, or the State does not 
have the ability to call upon forces that could prevent armed conflicts 
then it  is more likely that genocide will occur in that state. States must be 
willing to ask for and allow other nations with respectable armed forces to 
assist them in cases of armed conflict,  especially in matters of preventing 
and stopping genocide. The United Nations does make itself a beacon in 
regards to matters of genocide, but where the organization is sometimes 
flawed is in situations where peacekeepers are sent to areas in need of 
soldiers.  
 
In the case of Rwanda, UN peacekeepers were sent to oversee the 
conflict rather than intervene, costing thousands of lives. They were under 
strict orders to simply keep watch over the area and ensure that the Hutu 
and Tutsi were adhering to the Arusha Declaration. Despite the fact that 
many aspects of the Declaration were clearly being violated, the 
peacekeepers could nothing about the mass killing they saw as per their 
orders. These are just some of the common risk factors. As the study of 
genocide grows and more perpetrators of genocide and atrocity crimes are 
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brought to justice the more the world will learn and the better able forces 
will be at preventing genocide.  
 
The combined analysis of the Carnegie Commission and the U.N. 
Framework is proof of the progress made toward prevention. Their reports 
encompass all of the pathways to genocide and address all  of the links to 
armed conflict,  which have the highest potential to reach the point of 
genocide. Unfortunately it  took more instances of genocide in order to 
collect the data needed to compose the guidelines. Thanks to the Genocide 
Convention organizations like the Carnegie Commission have been able to 
bring to the dangers of genocide to the forefront of global security and 
humanitarian efforts.  
 
The	  Obligation	  To	  Punish	  
 
The obligation to prevent genocide has certainly proven to be a 
challenge to uphold. The obligation to punish those who commit the crime 
of genocide or any of the other punishable acts in Article III of the 
Convention has not been any easier to meet. Unfortunately the United 
Nations and the Contracting Parties to the Convention have come up short 
on this obligation many times, leaving the survivors of the post-
Convention era without much closure on their hellish experiences. It  
wasn’t until 2014 that the victims of the Cambodian Genocide saw justice 
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for the crimes committed against them. Thirty-five years after the Pol 
Pot’s gruesome rule over Cambodia ended, two of the only remaining 
perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide, Khieu Samphan who was 83 at 
the time, and Nuon Chea who was 88, stood trial in Cambodia, which was 
held by a joint United Nations and Cambodian tribunal The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. They were both convicted of having 
committed the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.54  
 
Although the two criminals were brought to trial and convicted, was 
justice really served? Some survivors struggle to find closure even after 
the verdict was reached. One survivor, Sokha Ten Meyer, was asked to 
share her reaction to the verdicts of the Khmer Rouge trial.  Amidst her 
anger from the nightmares she still  has from the dreadful experience, she 
also asked the obvious question of, “Why did it  take so long?”55 It  took 
thirty-five years to bring the murderers to trial.   
 
Both men were sentenced to life in prison but were in their eighties 
by the time a verdict was reached. Pol Pot himself was never brought to 
trial because he’d already died in 1998. Washington Post  Journalist 
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Elizabeth Becker spent time with Pol Pot while he was in power, covering 
him for the paper. She too had mixed feelings about the length of time it  
took to convict the criminals of the Pol Pot regime, “As Khmer Rouge 
leader Pol Pot’s brother-in-law, Ieng Sary was part of the movement from 
the beginning, and had intimate knowledge of it ,  But this is what happens 
when you wait 30 years to bring people to trial—this [his death before he 
could be brought to justice] should never have happened. Cambodians 
have been deprived of justice. Justice delayed is justice denied,”56 
 
These are all strong and justified sentiments. The Genocide 
Convention had been in force for almost thirty years when Pol Pot and his 
followers took over the capital city of Phnom Penh. Again the question 
could be asked, “Why did it  take so long?”57 The fact isn’t,  however, that 
the Convention itself has failed numerous victims. Its text provides for 
the required participation of the international community to aid in the 
effort to prevent and punish for the crime of genocide. The blame for the 
Convention’s shortcomings belongs to the Contracting parties and the 
United Nations for allowing minimal action on the part of other States, as 
well as for allowing such an extended period before the trial.   
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Hope	  
 
Yet, even in its shortcomings, there is still  great potential for the 
Convention and the guidelines it  has helped to create for preventing and 
punishing for the crime of genocide. The analysis can help to set the 
precedence for identifying criminals with genocidal intent before and or 
after they have committed the crime. Article III of the Convention labels 
“conspiracy to commit genocide” and “direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide” as punishable acts.58 These are actions that,  if  
identified and preempted, could both prevent genocide and help rein in 
potential criminals before lives are lost.   
 
Without the third obligation of international cooperation none of 
the analysis or actions plans would matter. Without the willingness of the 
Contracting Parties to work together there essentially is no Convention 
and therefore no stopping the monster that is genocide. The fact that the 
Convention needed twenty States to agree to its drafting in the first place, 
and that the Convention will no longer exist without the support of at 
least sixteen States,59 shows that without the dedication of multiple States 
the law itself cannot be upheld. 
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We have seen multiple instances of how humanity suffers when 
there is little to no international cooperation in preventing and punishing 
genocidal criminals. With each case of post-Convention genocide in 
Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Darfur, there was a lack of 
participation by the Contracting Parties as a whole. Few times were their 
major joint efforts by the Parties, which may have quelled the violence 
sooner rather than later.   
 
The rise of global terrorism has posed a unique challenge to the 
willingness of the Contracting Parties to cooperate. Terrorist groups like 
ISIS, HAMAS, and Al-Qaeda have in many ways violated the laws of the 
Convention, yet these groups and organizations are thriving and seem to 
add more to their ranks everyday. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) has rooted itself in the northern regions of Iraq and Syria and 
remains in control of those areas. The group intends to spread terror and 
to establish jihadist nation states around the globe to usher in what radical 
jihadist refer to as the “Caliphate” or the “Global Islamic State”.60  
 
This violent and relentless drive to make the world over in the 
image of the so-called “New Caliphate”, poses a threat to every to all 
including other Muslims. In most cases conversion isn’t an option, and 
when it is but victims refuse they are subjected to torture and death. Other 
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Muslims especially Shiite Muslims, who disagree with the tactics of these 
groups, are also at risk. When these groups invade towns and cities they 
force the Muslim and Christian citizens to join their ranks. One CNN 
reporter interviewed a teenager in a Syrian prison who tells the reporter 
that,  “They captured my village and gave me a choice: either join ISIS or 
be beheaded.”61  
 
ISIS and its “affiliates” have been responsible for a number of 
human rights violations throughout the last three decades. One of the 
group’s most recent acts was the public beheading of American Journalist 
James Foley. An ISIS fighter stood over a kneeled Foley who forcibly 
read a prompt, which was most likely written by his captors, condemning 
the United States for having interfered with ISIS activity in Iraq.62 After 
finishing the prompt Foley was beheaded, live and in front of the world. 
Another American Journalist,  Joel Sotloff,  was brought in front of the 
camera by the masked knifeman who then threatened to take Sotloff’s life 
too if American President Barack Obama did not call off American air 
strikes in Iraq.63 If left unchecked these groups could grow even larger 
and amass the weapons and support necessary to commit acts of genocide. 
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Hamas, the organization of the Islamic resistance movement, has 
been just as brutal toward its target: Israel.  Much like ISIS Hamas seeks 
to help usher in the so-called “new Caliphate” and directly targets Jews 
and Christians in Israel.  In 2001 a Hamas fighter walked into a Sbarro in 
Jerusalem and self detonated a bomb, which was surrounded by nails and 
other sharp metal objects. The suicide bomber injured one hundred and 
thirty people and killed seven.64 Hamas is dedicated to attacking, torturing 
and killing Jews even if it  means sacrificing the lives of its own 
followers. In the Preamble of Hamas’ Charter the organizations declares 
its intent to rid the Jerusalem of Jews, “Our battle with the Jews is long 
and dangerous, requiring all dedicated efforts.  It  is as phase which must 
be followed by succeeding phases, a battalion which must be supported by 
battalion after battalion of the divided Arab and Islamic world until  the 
enemy is overcome, and the victory of Allah descends.”65 
 
These groups have launched missiles at Israeli civilians and their 
homes almost weekly. They’ve built  underground tunnels that lead next to 
and into public buildings such as schools, masques, and temples in order 
to deploy their “soldiers” throughout civilian neighborhoods. These 
terrorists have resorted to using human shields, many times not caring 
about whether or not the person is Jewish or Muslim. Christian civilians 
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and travelers have been kidnapped and publicly beheaded by members of 
these organizations and the footage of these vicious occurrences has often 
been made public via the Internet.  Still  somehow the powers of the United 
Nations have not found a way to prevent these horrible events from 
happening. Again, if these acts aren’t stopped, and these organizations 
aren’t dismantled, genocide may be the next step in achieving their goals.  
 
Global jihadist terrorism is a threat that neither prevention nor 
punishment can outright cure. ISIS and Hamas insurgents have pledge to 
fight until  the Caliphate rules the world. How then do you prevent them 
from doing so? Diplomacy will not stop them because to them there is no 
compromise to be made. If they will continue to commit crimes against 
humanity how will the Contracting Parties go about punishing the 
members of these groups? Many of the jihadists have threatened to 
commit suicide upon being detained. Sitting them in a courtroom and 
putting them into prison cells doesn’t stop them or their organizations. If 
anything it  only antagonizes them and inspires them to capture, torture, 
and kill  more innocent people. From their perspective, even upon being 
imprisoned or killed while waging jihad, they aren’t being punished. They 
consider themselves to be serving God.   
 
The one silver lining amidst the global threat of genocide is that it  
forces international cooperation. Countries have to share intelligence with 
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one another to fight back against Hamas, ISIS and their affiliates. As it  
stands the Genocide Convention and the support offered for preventing 
genocide by organizations like the Carnegie Commission haven’t won the 
battle against global terrorism. Nonetheless much progress has been and 
will continue to be made.  
 
The Genocide Convention is not perfect in text or in practice; no 
law is nor is it  intended to be. However virtuous laws, including the 
Convention, are intended to be proponents of justice and civility. The text 
itself has inspired global awareness of the threat of genocide and has 
created the opportunity for an elevated level of international cooperation. 
It  is the interpretation of the law by its Contracting Parties along with the 
Supervision of the United Nations that has at times failed to prevent and 
or punish for the crime of genocide. They too are not perfect and do not 
claim to be. What is certain is that the Convention has the potential to 
stifle the threat of genocide given that its Contracting Parties improve 
their efforts to collaborate with one another. The public too has a role in 
the success or the failure of the Convention. We all must continue to be 
critical of the Convention and of those Parties associated with it  if  we 
intend to one day find a permanent solution to the “problem from hell”.66 
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